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Abstract
The author proposes anew equilibrium model for stock price processes.
We first consider our one-period formulation, and then its continuous-time
analogue. The dynamics of the resulting price process is determined by
the distribution of risk tolerance among the agents, and for some special
case we recover the Black-Scholes stock price model.
1Introduction
$\mathrm{T}1_{1}\mathrm{e}$ theory of equilibriun] under uncertainty was introduced by Arrow [1]. There
is now an extensive literature on the stochastic (or dynamic) equilibria as well,
see e.g. Duffie [4] and Karatzas [7]. Their equilibrium approach is formulated in
an abstract framework, and is capable of dealing with the general case. However,
since only exogenous events are used for contingencies, the theory does not
always seem to be suitable for vividly describing the energy in the stock market.
See also Radner [12].
In order to give more realistic models, there is an increasing interest in the
market microstruc $\mathrm{t}n$ re theory. Two of the earliest works of the field are Gross-
rnan&Stiglitz [5] and Kyle [8]. Here the market mechanism for determining the
stock price is in spotlight, and asymmetric information among the agents often
plays amajor role. For references see e.g. $\mathrm{O}$ ’-Iara’sbook [10] and an expository
paper of Biais&Rochet $[\cdot.3]$ .
$\mathrm{I}_{11}$ $\mathrm{t}1_{1}\mathrm{e}$
$\mathrm{p}\iota\cdot \mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ article, we $\mathrm{t}\iota\cdot \mathrm{y}$ $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{O}}\sigma \mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}$ a new type of equilibrium formulation
for stock price processes. For the following three reasons our approach may be
suitable $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}1^{\cdot}$ describing short-terrn behavior.
.An earlier version of this work is $\mathrm{r}$ egistered $,\backslash \mathrm{s}$ Working Paper 49, Faculty of Cornrnerce.
Hitotsubashi University $(.\backslash 1j\backslash 1^{\cdot}\mathrm{c}11 2000)$ .
$\uparrow\ulcorner_{\lrcorner^{-\prime 1\mathrm{l},)}}$. $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{I}:\mathrm{C},\iota \mathrm{k}_{\grave{\ell}}.\mathrm{o}\mathrm{k}.i\backslash \acute{\mathrm{C}\Delta}’\iota\iota\iota \mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\iota$. $|_{1\dot{\mathrm{I}}\mathrm{C}- \mathrm{t}.j\backslash \mathrm{c}.\mathrm{j}|)}$
$\mathrm{t}1i_{\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\prime}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{t},\iota \mathrm{c}\mathrm{I}_{\mathfrak{l}}\mathrm{i}- \mathrm{C}^{\cdot}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\}’$. Tokyo lSb-5601.
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$\bullet$ The current stock price is assumed to be given, and the probability dis-
tribution of the price at the next moment will be determined only by the
agents’ strategies. The fundamental value of the stock is not considered.
$\bullet$ The agents maxi mize their utility functions moment by moment. $i.e$ . they
are myopic.
$\bullet$ No consumption, $\dot{\mathrm{n}}0$ production is considered.
Our approach also has the following features.
$\bullet$ It is possible to model both amarket with the presence of large investors
alld amarket with small investors only.
$\bullet$ Our formulation is in asense agame-theoretic one. Even small investors
are not purely price takers: each of them is able to give infinitesimal (but
direct) impact for the determination of the price at the next moment.
$\bullet$ The difference in risk preferences among the agents, rather than informa-
tional asymmetries, is amajor factor.
$\bullet$ The resulting stock price process has atime-varying volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2we give our one-period for-
mulation and result. The assertions there are proved in Section 3. Acontinuous-
time analogue is considered in Section 4, and apossible extension is mentioned in
Section 5. The appendix is atechnical note on the applicability of the stocha stic
Fubini theorem.
The author wishes to thank Professor Akihiko Takahashi for helpful com-
ments.
2One-period model and result
Throughout this paper, $R_{+}$ is defined as the set of all nonnegative real numbers
and $R_{++}$ the set of all strictly positive numbers. For $x\in R$ , define $x^{+}$ as
lllax{x, 0}.
Definition 2.1 Let $(A, A, \nu)$ be ameasure space, where $\{\zeta|.\}\in A$ for all $a\in A$ .
Suppose the three $111\mathrm{e}_{C}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e}$ functions are $0\sigma \mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}$ :
$V$ : $Aarrow R_{++}$ ,
$\xi$ : $Aarrow R$,
$\gamma$ : $Aarrow R_{++}$ .
For notational simplicity we denote $V(a)$ by $V_{a}$ : the sa me rule is applied for all
measurable functions on $A$ .
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Interpretation. The measure space $(A, A, \nu)$ is interpreted as the set of all
agents in the market; this setting is used for the theory of large economies, $\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}$ .
Hildenbrand [6]. Each $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})>0$ is interpreted as alarge investor.
and every $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})=0$ is asmall investor. YVe consider asecurities
market where the agents exchange two assets, the stock and the riskless bond.
No consumption is considered, every agent is solely interested in the rate of
return of her portfolio. Assume that the interest rate is zero and that the stock
pays no dividends. We also assume that the initial stock price is already given.
Each agent $a\in A$ is initially endowed with the stock worth $V_{a}\xi_{a}$ yen and the
bond worth $V_{a}(1-\xi_{\iota\iota})$ yen, in total $V_{a}$ yen. As we will see in Definition 2.2
below, every agent is risk-averse, and $\gamma_{a}$ represents agent $a’.\mathrm{s}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}11\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ to take
risk.
Our price change mechanism is as follows. First each agent $a\in A$ decides
how much to trade assets and how much to exert influence. Then the stock
price changes, where the mean $\mu$ and the variance $\sigma^{\underline{)}}$.of the rate of change are
determined by the agents’ strategies. Furthermore, for every investor, the return
of her portfolio turns out to maximize her utility $U_{a}$ given the other agents’
strategies, so things are somewhat like the Nash-equilibrium formulation.
Definition 2.2 Fix $\mathrm{c}_{1}$ , $c_{arrow}’\in R_{arrow+}|$ throughout this paper. For each pair of
measurable functions
$X$ : $Aarrow R$ ,
$\rho$ : $Aarrow R_{+}$
satisfying the following three conditions
$/\cdot.4|_{-}\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}|\rho^{\frac{}{a},}’ d\nu$ $<\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}$ ,
$0<$
$\int_{4}..|\wedge \mathrm{Y}_{a}|\rho_{a}d\nu\int_{4^{-}}\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{[perp]}d\nu$ $<<\infty\infty,$
’
$\}$ $(*)$
we define $l^{\iota}\in R$ , $\sigma\in R_{-}$, ’ and two $R$-valued measurable functions 0and $U$ on
$\mathit{4}\angle 1\dot{<}1\mathrm{S}$










Definition 2.3 Apair $(X’, \rho^{*})$ of measurable functions
$X^{*}$ : $Aarrow R$ ,
$\rho^{*}$ : $Aarrow R_{+}$ ,
is said to be an equilibrium (resp. aweak equilibrium) if it satisfies the conditions











(i-1) For every $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})>0$ , the pair $(.\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}, \rho_{a}^{*})\in R\cross R_{+}$
maximizes (resp. locally maximizes)
$U_{a}(\{\{X_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, .\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}\},$ $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, /J_{u}\})$
subject to $X_{a}\in R$ and $\rho_{a}\in R_{+}$ .
(i-2) For almost every $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})=0$ , $\theta_{a}^{*}$ solves the problem
$\theta_{\alpha\vee}\max_{=R}\{\theta_{a}\cdot\mu^{*}-\frac{1}{2\gamma_{a}}\theta_{a}^{2}\cdot(\sigma^{*})^{2}\}$
with $\mu^{*}$ and $\sigma^{*}$ considered to be given constants, and $\rho_{a}^{*}$ solves
$\max_{\rho_{\alpha\overline{\sim}}^{\prime R_{+}}}\{\theta_{a}^{*}\cdot c_{1}X_{a}^{*}\rho_{a}-\frac{1}{2\gamma_{a}}(\theta_{a}^{*})^{2}\cdot c_{\underline{)}}.|X_{a}^{*}|\rho_{\overline{a}}|’\}$ .
(ii) $\int_{4}.\cdot \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}\prime d\nu=0$ . (Market Clearing Condition)
Interpretation. Each agent $a\in A$ buys the stock worth $.\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}$’ yen and ex-
erts influence $\rho_{a}^{*}$ . After the exchange and before the price change, her portfolio
consists of $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ stock worth $V_{a}\cdot\theta_{a}^{*}$ yen and the bond worth $V_{a}\cdot\{1-\theta_{a}^{*}\}$ yen.
Moreover $\int_{4}.(X_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu=.\frac{1}{\underline{)}}/\cdot.4|.\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}|d\nu$ represents the trading volume.
The condition (i-2) is heuristically derived as follows. Every small investor
wants to $11\mathrm{l}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}$ the (non-rigorous) expression
$\theta_{a}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a})\cdot c_{1}....\cdot.\frac{/_{4}\prime \mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*}\rho_{b\cdot a}^{*}d\nu+\prime \mathrm{Y}\rho_{a}\triangle\nu(c\iota.)}{/_{4}(\mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*})^{+}d\nu+-^{J}\mathrm{Y}_{\iota\iota}^{+}\triangle l/(c\iota.)}$
.
$-. \frac{1}{2\gamma_{a}}\theta_{\overline{a}}..,(.\mathrm{Y}_{a})\cdot c_{-}.,\cdot...’\frac{/_{4}|_{J\mathrm{v}}i|(\rho_{b})^{\underline{)}}d\nu+|.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}|\rho^{\frac{..)}{u}}\Delta\nu(a)}{/_{4}(.,\backslash _{b}’*)^{+}d/+Y_{a}^{+}\Delta\nu(c\iota)}..’.\cdot$
.
$\approx$ $\theta_{\mathrm{c}\prime}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a})\cdot\{l^{\iota^{*}}+\cdot..\frac{C_{1}K_{\mathrm{t}l}\rho_{a}-l^{\iota \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{+}}\prime}{\mathrm{J}_{4}(_{\grave{J}}^{\prime \mathrm{s}}b)^{+}d\nu}..\triangle\nu(a)\}$
$- \frac{1}{2\gamma_{a}}\theta_{\overline{a}}..,(.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}’)\cdot\{(\sigma^{*})^{\sim}.)+\underline,...\frac{\mathrm{c}|\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}|\rho_{\overline{a}}-(\sigma^{*})’}{\mathit{1}_{4b}^{(\prime)^{+}d_{l/}}\iota’*}.,..\underline’$
$.\iota_{a}’’+\triangle\nu(\mathit{0})\}$
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subject to $X_{a}\in R$ and $\rho_{a}\in R_{\underline{|}}$ , which leads to (i-2). It should be remarked
that, for the maximization of utility, the agent here does not have to know all
of the other agents’ strategies; she uses only the values of $\mu^{*}$ and $\sigma^{*}$ .
The greater influence the agent exerts, the more favorable $\mu$ will be for
her, but at the same time the more volatile the change will be. The author
believes that the influence $\rho_{a}^{*}$ can be formulated as the extent of $‘’.\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$
randomization” of each agent’s excess demand (hence the source of randomness
is purely endogenous), but to be frank he himself still does not have a100%
clear vision of $\rho^{*}$ .
Remark If $\nu(\{a\})=0$ for $\mathrm{a}11a\in A$ then, by definition, there is no distinction
between an equilibrium and aweak equilibrium. Note also that in case of
$\prime\prime|A<\infty$ , the number of unknown variables $\{X_{a}^{*}\}_{a}\simeq..\mathrm{s}$ and $\{\rho_{a}^{*}\}_{a’A}=$ is $2\beta A$ ,
while the number of equations they have to satisfy to be a(weak) equilibrium
is essentially $2^{1}|\dashv,A+1$ .
We proceed with the following three assumptions:
Assumption 1 $\int_{A}V_{a}|\xi_{a}|d\nu<\infty$ and $S^{\mathrm{d}}=^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}} \int_{4},V_{a}\xi_{a}d\nu>0$:
Assumption 2 $\Gamma \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}=\int_{4}.V_{a}\gamma_{a}d\nu<\infty$:
Assumption 3 $\frac{\mathrm{t}ac}{\gamma_{a}}$ is not constant in $a$ .
The integral $S$ represents the initial total market value of the stock.
Theorem 2.4
(1) Under the above assumptions, the following $(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$ is a weak equi-
librium.
$-\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}$ $=$ $V_{a} \{\frac{S}{\Gamma}\wedge fa-\xi_{a}\}\dot{J}$
.
$\rho_{a}^{*}$ $=$ $\{$




any $\mathit{7}\mathit{7},on\tau\iota egati\iota\prime e$ $n$ ri.mbcr if $J\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}=0$ .





$\sigma^{*}$ $=$ $C \frac{\Gamma}{S}$ ,
$U_{a}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}^{*}, \rho^{*})$ $=$
$\frac{C}{2}\underline’\gamma_{a}$ ,
where $C= \frac{\mathrm{c}\prime}{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} e_{2}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}$ .
(2) Assume further that every $a\in A$ satisfies $\nu(\{a\})=0$ . Then the
above pair $(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$ is the unique equilibrium satisfying $\sigma^{*}>0$ , except for the
arbitrariness $of\rho_{a}^{*}for$ $a\in A$ with $X_{a}^{*}=0$ . Moreover, there exists an equilibrium
with $\sigma^{*}=0$ if and only if $\nu(\{a\in A : \xi_{a}<0\})>0$ .
The proof will be given in Section 3.
Remarks 1. Suppose agroup of agents B $\in A$ get together to form asingle










For this new market, as far as Assumption 3is satisfied, we get the same values
of $S$ and $\Gamma$ , and consequently the same $\mu^{*}$ and $\sigma^{*}$ . On the other hand, the
trading volume $/\cdot.4$ $(.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu$ is no longer the same.




Example 2.5 Suppose there exists an $c\iota$ $\in A$ with $\mathrm{v}\{\{\mathrm{a}\})>0$ such that
$X_{b}^{*}>0$ for all $b\neq a$;we will here show that the weak equilibrium $(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$
of Tbeorern 2.4 is not an equilibrium. By the market clearing condition (ii) we
have
$\int_{4\backslash \langle a\}}.(,\acute{\mathrm{Y}}_{b}^{*})^{+}d\nu$ $=$ $-J\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}\nu(\{a\})$
$=$ $V_{a}\{\mathrm{t}ca$ $- \frac{S}{\Gamma}\wedge \mathit{1}a\}\nu(\{a\})$
$<$ $V_{a}\xi_{a}\nu(\{c\iota.\})$ .
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Also if $-\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}\uparrow-V_{a}\xi_{a}$ then Oa(Xa) $\uparrow 0$ , which implies that
$\lim_{X_{a}\uparrow-V_{a}\text{\’{e}}_{0}}$




$=$ $U_{a}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}^{*}.\rho^{*}’)$ .
Thus our $X_{a}^{*}$ and $\rho_{a}^{*}$ do not globally maximize agent $a’ \mathrm{s}$ utility.
We can generalize the above example to give
Proposition 2.6 For each $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})>0$ :
(1) There exists no $(\overline{X}_{a},\overline{\rho}_{a})\in R\cross R_{+}$ satisfying the following trno
properties.
$\bullet$
$-^{J}\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{a}\geq 0$ or $\theta_{a}(,’\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{a})\geq 0$ ,
$\bullet$ $U_{a}$ ( $\{\{_{\sim}\mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \wedge\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{a}’\}$ , $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a},\tilde{\rho}_{a}\}$ ) $>U_{a}(X^{*}, \rho^{*}).$,
?JJhere $(\wedge \mathrm{Y}^{*}’, \rho^{*})$ is the weak equilibrium of Theorem 2.4.
(2) Suppose $\xi_{a}\geq 0$ and $\int_{A\backslash \{a\}}(-^{J}\mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*})^{+}d\nu>0$ . then in order that there
exists sorne $(-’\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{a},\tilde{\rho}_{a})\in R\cross R_{+}$ satisfying the following two properties
$\bullet$ $X\sim a<0$ and $\theta_{a}(-\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{a})<0$ ,
$\bullet$ $U_{a}$ ( $\{\{X_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \wedge\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}_{\iota\iota}’\}$ , $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a},\tilde{\rho}_{a}\}$ ) $>U_{a}(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$ ,
it i.s necessary and sufficient that
$. \cdot\frac{\mathrm{t}_{a\zeta a}^{c}\prime l/(\prime\{c/.\})}{/_{4\backslash \{\mathrm{c}\iota\}}(.\prime\backslash _{b}^{r_{*}})\underline{|}cl\iota/,\ell}+\{(.\cdot.\cdot\frac{V_{\mathrm{t}1}\frac{\dot{\mathrm{b}}}{\Gamma}\wedge fal/(\{c\iota\})}{\underline{9}/_{4\backslash \{a\}}(\wedge \mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*}\prime)\underline{1}cl\nu}.-1)^{\mathrm{t}^{-}}\}^{\underline{)}}$
.
$>$ 1.
The proof uses only standard methods (such as considering some separate
cases and differentiating the utility), so it is omitted here
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3Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof of Theorem 2.4 (1) It is easily seen that the pair $(X’, \rho^{*})$ satisfies
the conditions (i-2) and (ii). The expression for $\mu^{*}$ is shown as follows:
$\mu^{*}$ $=$ $c_{1}. \cdot.\frac{\int_{4}\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}\rho_{a}^{*}d\nu}{\int_{4}(X_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu}$
$=$ $c_{1} \cdot\frac{c_{1}}{C_{-}},\frac{\Gamma}{S}$, $\cdot.\cdot.\frac{\int_{4}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu}{\int_{4}(\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu},$.
$=$ $C^{2} \frac{\Gamma}{S}$ .
The expression for $\sigma^{*}$ can be proved $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ same way. Here Assumptions 1and
2guarantee the integrability of $X^{*}$ and other quantities. $.\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}$’ is not identically
zero by Assumption 3, hence $\int_{4}.(X_{a}^{*})^{+}d\nu>0$ .
We will divide the proof of the validity of condition (i-1) into the following
four cases of $a\in A$ with $\nu(\{a\})>0$ .
Case 1: ,$\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}>0$ and $\int_{A\backslash \{a\}}(X_{b}^{*})^{+}d\nu>0$ . We see that
$( \frac{\partial}{\partial X_{a}}.)^{k}\mu(X^{*}, \rho^{*})=$ $( \frac{\partial}{\partial X_{a}})^{\mathrm{A}}.\sigma^{-}.$
,
$(.\prime \mathrm{Y}^{*}, \rho^{*})=0$ $(\theta)$
for every $k\in N$ , thus
$\frac{\partial}{\partial\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}}.U_{a}(_{J}\mathrm{Y}^{*}, \rho^{*})=\frac{\partial}{\partial\rho_{a}}U_{a}(_{J}\mathrm{Y}^{*}, \rho^{*})=0$
and alittle more calculation shows
$( \frac{\partial}{\partial_{J}\mathrm{Y}_{a}}.)\underline’ U_{a}(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$ $=$ $- \frac{1}{V_{a}\wedge[a}\underline,\cdot C^{-}\cdot$
,
$( \frac{\Gamma}{S})^{-}.,$ ,
$( \frac{\partial}{\partial\rho_{a}}.)\underline’ U_{a}(.\prime \mathrm{Y}^{*}, \rho^{*})$ $=$ $-( \frac{S}{\Gamma}).\wedge fa\underline{)}$ . $c_{-} \cdot,\cdot.\cdot\frac{\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}\prime\nu(\{a\})}{\int_{4}(\prime \mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*})^{+}d\iota/}$ ,
$\frac{\partial}{\partial_{J}\mathrm{Y}_{a}}$
.
$\cdot-,\p rtial\rho_{a}U_{a}(X^{*}, \rho^{*})$ $=$ $- \frac{c_{1}}{V_{a}}\cdot...\cdot\frac{\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}\prime t/(\{a\})}{/_{4}(\prime \mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*})\underline{|}cl\nu}$ .





Case \yen and $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}/\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\cdot\cdot\{\cdot\}(.\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}})^{+}d\mathrm{p}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} 0$ . In this case we see that
X; $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ 0 for a.e. $b_{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}!\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ a, so $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}.\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{a}>0$ then
$U_{a}(\{\{X_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, X_{a}\},$ $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \rho_{a}\})$
$=$ $\theta_{a}(X_{a})\cdot c_{1}\rho_{a}-\frac{1}{2_{[a}\wedge}\theta_{a}^{2}(X_{a})\cdot c\underline’\rho_{\overline{a}}’$ ,
which is clearly maximized by our $.\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}$ and $\rho_{a}^{*}$ .
Case 3: $-\prime \mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}<0$ . If $X_{a}<0$ and $\theta_{a}(X_{a})>0$ , then it is easy to see that
nlax $U_{a}(\{\{X_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, X_{a}\},$ $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \rho_{a}\})$
$\rho_{a\sim}=R_{+}$
is solved }) $\mathrm{y}$ $\rho_{a}^{*}=0$ . Also, given $\rho_{a}^{*}=0$ our $-\mathrm{Y}_{a}^{*}$ locally maximizes the utility,
since the equality (0) in Case 1holds for this case too.
Case 4: $X_{a}^{*}=0$ . In this case it is trivial that
$U_{a}(X^{*},$ $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \rho_{a}\})$
does not depend on $\rho_{a}$ . Acalculation reveals that the right partial derivative
of $U_{a}$ with respect to $X_{a}$ at $(\wedge \mathrm{Y}^{*}’$ , $\{\{\rho_{b}^{*}\}_{b\neq a}, \rho_{a}\}$ ) is
$-. \frac{C\cdot)^{\wedge}fa}{2\mathrm{J}_{A}(\mathrm{Y}_{b}^{*})^{\neq}d\nu}.(\frac{S}{\Gamma})^{2}\{\rho_{a}-\frac{c_{1}}{c\underline{\cdot)}}\frac{\Gamma}{S}$. $\}^{\underline{)}}.\nu(\{a\})$ .
which is strictly negative if $\rho_{a}\neq\lrcorner_{\frac{\Gamma}{s}}cc\underline{\circ}$ . Likewise the left derivative can be shown





can show that our our $X_{a}^{*}$ and $\rho_{a}^{*}$ locally $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}$ the utility,
Proof of Theorem 2.4 (2) The pair $(.\prime \mathrm{Y}^{*}., \rho^{*})$ in the statement of the
Theorem is the unique equilibrium satisfying $\sigma^{*}>0$ . Indeed, if $\sigma^{*}>0$ then it
follows from the condition (i-2) that
$\theta_{a}^{*}$ $=$ $\frac{l^{\iota^{*}}}{(\sigma^{*})\underline{)}}.\gamma_{\iota}’,$ .
$X_{\mathrm{t}l}^{*}$ $=$ $V_{a} \{\frac{\ell\iota^{*}}{(\sigma^{*})\underline{)}}.\wedge \mathit{1}a-\xi_{a}\}$ .
This together with (ii) implies
$\frac{\mu^{*}}{(\sigma^{*})}\underline,=.\frac{\int_{A}V_{a}\xi_{a}d_{lJ}}{\int_{4}V_{a^{\wedge}\prime a}d\nu}=\frac{S’}{\Gamma}$ ,
which gives $\wedge\iota_{a}^{r_{*}}’$ , $/\mathrm{J}_{\mathrm{t}}^{*},\dot,$ and consequently $l^{\iota^{*}}$ and $\sigma^{*}$
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Next we consider the possibility that there exists an equilibrium satisfying
$\sigma^{*}=0$ . For such an equilibrium we have.X’ $\rho^{*}\equiv 0$ , thus by (i-2)
$\theta_{a}^{*}\cdot X_{a}^{*}=(\xi_{a}+\frac{X_{a}^{*}}{V_{a}})\cdot X_{a}^{*}\leq 0$
for $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$ . $a\in A$ . Such an $X^{*}$ exists if and only if $\nu(\{c|. : \xi_{a}<0\})>0$ . $\square$
4Continuous-time analogue
Our one eriod model of Section 2is extended to the multi-period one as follows.
Initially, each agent $a$ is endowed with $V_{a}(0)$ and $\mathrm{S}ac(0)$ . In this section her risk
preference $\gamma_{a}$ is assumed not to change over time. (For the case of time-varying
$7\mathrm{a}(\mathrm{t})$ see Section 5.) The total market value of the stock changes from $5(0)$ to
$\mathrm{S}\{\mathrm{t}$ ), where the rate of change $\frac{S(1)-\mathrm{S}(0]}{\mathrm{S}(0)}$ has mean $\mu^{*}(0)$ and standard deviation
$\sigma^{*}(0)$ , as we saw in Section 2. The change in price determines Va (1) and Va(l)
for each agent (no additional endowment is considered), and our equilibrium
argument restarts from there, giving $5(2)$ , $5(3)$ , $\cdots$ successively. Note that each
agent maximizes her utility moment by moment.
Now we consider the continuous-time analogues of the price process $\mathrm{S}\{\mathrm{t}$ ) and
the portfolio value Va(t), without rigorously building the model. Assumptions
1through 3are modified here as:
Assumption 1’ $\int_{4}.V_{a}(0)|_{\mathrm{S}a}^{c}(0)|d\nu<\infty$
and $5(0)= \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\int_{4}.V_{a}(0)\xi_{a}(0)d.\nu>0_{1}$.
Assumption 2’ $\int_{4}.V_{a}(0)_{a}\wedge’ d.\nu<\infty\cdot.$,
Assumption 3’
$\underline{\xi_{a}(0)}$
is not constant in $a$ .
$\gamma_{a}$
In addition we need
Assumption 4 $\gamma_{a}$ is not constant in a,
otherwise $\underline{\xi_{a}}\cup t$ would be constant in $a$ for $t>0$ , which would violate the ” $t>0^{:}$
.
version of Assumption 3’. It is also convenient to assume that
Assumption 5 $S(0)= \int_{\mathrm{A}}.V_{a}(0)cll/$ ,
$.i.e$ . the net amount of bond in the market is zero. If $5(0)< \int_{4}.V_{a}(0)d\iota/\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ .
as we will see later, $S(t)$ could go negative for some $t>0$ .
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Under the above five assumptions, the stock price process $S(t)$ satisfies, by
analogy with Section 2,
$\frac{dS(t)}{S(t)}$ $=$ $\mathrm{S}(\mathrm{t})dS(t)+$ $\mathrm{S}(\mathrm{t})dt$
$=$ $\frac{\int_{44}V_{a}(t)\gamma_{a}d\nu}{S(t)}$ $(CdbV(t)+C^{2}dt).$,
where $W$ is astandard one-dimensional Brownian motion starting from the
origin. Furthermore, agent $a$ ’s portfolio value Va(t) satisfies
$\frac{dV_{a}(t)}{V_{a}(t)}$ $=$ $\theta_{a}^{*}(t)\frac{dS(t)}{S(t)}$.
$=$ $\gamma_{a}$ $(CdbV(t)+C\underline’ dt)$ ,
thus
Va (t) $= \mathrm{V}\mathrm{a}(0)\exp\{C\gamma_{a}\mathrm{W}(\mathrm{t})+c-,(\gamma_{a}-\frac{\gamma^{\frac{}{a},}}{2},)t\}$ .
It follows that if Assumption 2’ is satisfied, then the same property
$\int_{44}V_{a}(t)_{(a}^{\wedge}d\nu<\infty$ holds for all $t>0$ , $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}$ .
We see that
$\mathrm{S}(\mathrm{t})$ $=$ $\mathrm{S}\{0$ ) $+ \{\int_{A}$ Va(t) $d \nu-\int_{r^{4}\mathrm{t}}$ Va(0) $d\nu\}$ (4)




(for arigorous treatment of (4) see the appendix). The dynamics of $S$ is thus
determined by the distribution of $\wedge f$ with respect to $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ lneasure $\underline{V_{\alpha}(0)d\nu(a)}$
$\mathrm{J}\mathrm{J}$ $V_{b}(0)d\nu(b)$
$\mathrm{O}11$ $A$ . The value of $\mathrm{S}(\mathrm{t})$ is increasing with respect to the value of $\mathrm{I}^{J}V(t)$ , so the
process $S$ is Markovian. Also,
$‘ \frac{d-6^{\cdot}(t)}{S(t)}$. $=. \cdot...\frac{/_{4}V_{\mathrm{t}\mathit{1}}(t)\gamma_{a}cl\iota/}{/_{4}V_{a}(t)cl\iota}.,(Cd[\prime \mathrm{f}^{i}(t)+C^{\underline{)}}.clt)$
and hence the volatility of $S$ is $C$ times the market mean of $\wedge(a$ weighted by
Va(t). We give three examples.
Example 4.1 Assumption 4prohibits $\gamma$ from being constant in $a$ , but if
the distribution of $\hat,\cdot$ is concentrated in avery small neighborhood of one sin-
gle value, then the resulting process is close to aconstant-volatility $0\circ\cdot \mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}$
Brownian motion, $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}$ . the Black-Scholes stock price model
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Example 4.2 Suppose the distribution of 7has the density
$\frac{1}{Z}\exp(-\eta x\underline’+\lambda x)$ for $x\in R_{++}$ .




$\cdot$ $f( \frac{C1\prime V(t)+C-t+\lambda}{\sqrt{C-t+2\eta}},\cdot,)$ ,
where
$f(x)\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}=\sqrt{2\pi}\exp(\underline{x^{2}},)\Phi(x)-$
and $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution. Moreover,
$f(x)$ $\sim$ $\sqrt{2\pi}$ $\exp(\frac{x^{2}}{}\underline,)$ $(xarrow\infty)$ ,
$f(x)$ $\sim$ $\Pi x1$ $(xarrow-\infty)$ .
This fact implies that the distribution of $1\mathrm{o}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}S(t)$ has afatter tail on the right
than the normal distributions, and athinner tail on the left.
Example 4.3 Suppose that the density function is
A $\exp\{-\lambda(x-\ell)\}$ for $x>\ell$
and 0for $0<x\leq\ell$, where $\lambda\in R_{++}$ and $\ell\in R_{+}$ . Then
$5(\mathrm{t})$ $=$ $5(0) \cdot\frac{\lambda}{\sqrt{C- t}}.,\exp\{C\ell \mathrm{W}(\mathrm{t})+C^{2}(\ell-.\frac{\ell^{\underline{)}}}{2}.)t\}$
. $f( \frac{C\mathrm{I}\prime V(t)+(1-\ell)Ct-\lambda}{\sqrt{C^{2}t}}\underline’)$
with the function $f(\cdot)$ defined in the previous example. If $\ell>0$ then the distri-
butioll of $10_{\Phi}^{\mathrm{O}}.S(t)$ llas roughly the same tail on the left as anormal distribution.
Remarks 1. $\mathrm{Y}1\acute{\prime}\mathrm{e}$ can generalize the above observations to show the following.
In general, if $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}$ illf $\wedge fa>0$ then the left tail of $1_{0_{\Leftrightarrow}^{\circ}}\cdot S(t)$ is roughly the same
as that of anormal distribution, whereas if $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}$ illf $\wedge,\prime a=0$ then the left tail
is thinner than the normal distributions. Likewise, if esssup $\wedge(a<\infty$ then
$1\mathrm{o}_{\mathit{6}}^{\sigma}S(t)$ has roughly the same tail on the right as anormal distribution. and
otherwise the right tail is fatter. The right tail of $10_{\mathrm{o}}^{\circ}.S(t)$ cannot be thinner
than the left.
2. The price process $S$ has aunique equivalent martingale measure O..
$1_{-}11\iota \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ which
$\gamma V^{Q}(t)=\det \mathfrak{j}\prime \mathfrak{l}’(t)+Ct$
154
is aBrownian motion. The market is thus complete. Since $S$ is the sum (or
integral) of some constant-volatility geometric Brownian motions driven by the
same $|/V^{Q}$ , we have that $\forall T\in R_{++}$ , $\forall K\in R_{++}$ , $\exists k$ : $Aarrow R_{++}$ ,
$(S_{\acute{T}}-K)^{+}= \int_{44}\{V_{a}(T)-k_{a}\}^{+}d\nu$.
Thus the price of aEuropean call option on $S$ is the sum of some Black-Scholes
formulae, just as Jamshidian’s trick works for options on coupon-bearing bonds
(see e.g. p.170 of Baxter&Rennie [2] or p.298 of Musiela&Rutkowski [9]).
5Conclusion
In this paper we considered an equilibrium model for describing the short-term
stock price behavior. Under mild assumptions we proved that there exists aweak
equilibrium, which is the unique equilibrium if every agent is asmall investor
and her initial endowment of the stock is non-negative. Amarket with the
presence of large investors is shown to be less stable than amarket with small
investors only. The dynamics of the price process depends on the distribution of
risk tolerance among the $\mathrm{a}\circ\cdot \mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{S}_{\}}\mathrm{o}$ . in particular, if the distribution is concentrated
in asmall neighborhood of one single value, then the resulting process is close
to the well-known Black-Scholes model. If agroup of agents get together to
forlll asingle institutional investor, then we have the same price dynamics but
the $\mathrm{t}1^{\cdot}\dot{\mathrm{c}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}11_{\mathrm{o}}^{\circ}$. volume is no longer the same.
Abetter understanding of the influence $\rho_{\dot{J}}^{*}$ one of the key concepts for our
equilibrium mechanism, is left for future studies.
In Section 4we considered only the case that each agent’s risk tolerance.
$\hat,a$ ’is constant through time, but it is also possible to consider the case of
time-varying $\gamma_{a}(t)$ . For instance, $\wedge[a(t)$ can be formulated so that it increases
with respect to the value of Va (t). Our equilibrium price process still exists if
Assumptions 1through 5appropriately modified, are all satisfied. If one of
those models fails to satisfy Assumption 2for some finite time $t$ , $i.e$ . if
$P[ \int_{4}.V_{a}(t)_{fa}\wedge(t)d\nu$ $=\infty$ for some $t>0]>0$ ,
then we can interpret the explosion as the burst of aprice $\mathrm{b}\iota\iota \mathrm{b}\mathfrak{l}$) $[\mathrm{e}$ .
6Appendix: Applicability of the stochastic Fu-
bini theorem
The equality (P) in Section 4is intuitively clear, but to prove it rigorously we
need to apply the stochastic Fubini theorem ( $\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}$ . Protter [11]. p. 160). $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}1_{1}\mathrm{e}-$
lllatically we formulate our problem as follows
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Definition A.I Let $(w(t))_{\ell}$ be astandard one-dimensional Brownian motion,
starting from the origin, on acertain filtered probability space $(\Omega, F, \mathcal{F}_{t}, P)$ .
$\mathrm{b}\mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}$ also consider another measure space $(B, B, m)$ and an $R_{+}$-valued measurable
function $\kappa$ on it. For each $b\in B$ let $(Vb\{t))_{t}$ be an adapted process satisfying
$dV_{b}(t)$ $=Vb\{t$ ) $\kappa_{b}$ dE{t)
$i.e.$ ,
$Vb\{t$ ) $=\mathrm{V}\mathrm{b}\{\mathrm{t}$) $\exp\{f\dot{\mathrm{v}}b\mathrm{w}(\mathrm{t})-\frac{h^{\frac{}{b},}}{2}.$
”
$t\}$ .
Moreover V.{0) is assumed to be an $R_{+}$-valued measurable function on $B$ .
Proposition A.2 Suppose the integrals
$\int_{B}$ Vb{t) $dm$ and $\int_{B}$ Vb $\{\mathrm{t})\kappa_{b}$. $d\cdot m$
are both finite. Then
$\Sigma(t)\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}=\int_{B}Vb\{t$) $dm$ and $\int_{B}Vb\{t)\kappa_{b}dm$
are both finite for all $t>0$ , $a.s$ . Furthermore we have that
$d \Sigma(t)=(\int_{B}Vb\{t$ ) $\kappa_{b}^{\wedge}dm)$ dE{t)
Remark Here $\kappa_{b}$ corresponds to $C\gamma_{a}$ in Section 4. The Brownian motion
$w(t)$ can be viewed as $bV(t)+Ct$ after some appropriate measure change.
Proof It is easy to prove the first half of our assertion, since
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}b\frac{\mathrm{u}\prime}{\sim}B\exp\{\kappa_{b}w(t)-\frac{\kappa_{b}^{2}}{2}.\cdot t\}<\infty$
for all $t>0$ , $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}$ . To prove the second half, we use aversion of tlle stochastic
Fubini theorem (Theorem IV.46 of [11]) and reduce the problem to showing that
$\int_{0}^{T}dt\int_{B}cl\cdot m$ Vb { $\mathrm{t})\kappa_{\overline{b}}$” $\exp\{2\mathrm{n}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{w}(\mathrm{t})-\kappa_{\tilde{b}}.\cdot t\})<\infty$
for all $T>0$ , $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}$ . Since
$\mathrm{s},\mathrm{p}\kappa_{b}\exp b\frac{\mathrm{u}}{\vee}B\{2\mathrm{n}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{w}(\mathrm{t})-\kappa_{\overline{b}}., t\}$




it suffices to show that
$\int_{0+}\frac{w(t)+\sqrt{w(t)+2t}}{2t}\underline’\exp\{\underline’\frac{w(t)+w(t)\sqrt{w(t)-+2t}}{2t}.,-\frac{1}{2}\}dt<\infty$ $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}$ .
The last inequality holds by the law of the iterated logarithm. $\square$
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